This section first presents the results of the Q-methodology for a general overview and perspectives of stakeholder perceptions. It then deepens the insights based on the interviews and focus group discussions. Characterization of Perspectives of the HIA and Ghana Cocoa REDD+ using Q-methodology
Enriching the Findings: Insights from Interviews and Focus Groups
The Q-analysis revealed four major themes related to governance, social and economic NCBs from Ghana Cocoa REDD+, of which three relate to governance NCBs: the potential and limitations of enhanced forest governance through the HIA; inclusion and participation; and land and tree tenure rights. One theme relates to social and economic NCBs: the limits to poverty alleviation. The subsections below provide more in-depth insights and enrich the findings on these themes based on the semi-structured interviews and focus groups.
The Potential and Limitations of Enhanced Forest Governance through the HIA
The interviews and focus groups with farmers and consortium partners reveal that the Juabuso-Bia HIA has initiated meaningful discussions on cocoa-induced deforestation and offered options for a collective response. The HIA has also incentivized the private sector to invest in the HIA, including the CREMAs, by supporting the development of by-laws, implementing alternative livelihood interventions, strengthening the HIA governance structures, and training HIA executives in landscape management. Through interviews, HIA executives suggested that the HIA governance framework has facilitated collaboration with cocoa companies and NGOs to improve forest governance in the landscape. A sub-HIA executive indicated that “Juabuso-Bia HIA has facilitated collaboration with other sub-HIAs in reducing unsustainable land use practices.” However, NGOs indicated in interviews that the HIA is not taking the lead in facilitating collaboration among sub-HIAs; rather, this is being left to the Forestry Commission, NGOs, and cocoa companies.
We deduced from the interviews and focus group discussions with respondents from the Forestry Commission and NGOs that in establishing the HIA to strengthen landscape governance, several quasi-legal governance instruments were developed. For example, both CREMAs and the sub-HIAs have constitutions, management plans, and by-laws. From the interviews with the NGOs, we gathered that some of the governance instruments for the CREMAs that existed prior to the HIA have not been revised to reflect the HIA’s new structure and functions. Despite the development of quasi-governance frameworks, we found through interviews that CREMA executives and field-level officers of the consortium partners were not familiar with the HIA structures and most of the governance instruments. It also emerged from the focus group discussions that poor dissemination of HIA activities has led to low awareness of the HIA and its activities in the cocoa landscape. Due to the low local awareness of the HIA, a representative of the Forestry Commission posited that “very few people involve themselves in HIA activities.”
Interviews with the Forestry Commission indicate that the limited inclusion of communities in the HIA is partly due to financial constraints and partly due to the unwillingness of some communities to be part of the HIA governance system. The Forestry Commission was of the view that they had provided all necessary information to communities by applying principles of Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) in the REDD+ program. However, interviews with NGOs revealed weaknesses in community entry processes and a lack of efforts by the Forestry Commission to sustain communities’ interest in the Ghana Cocoa REDD+ program. An example mentioned by NGOs includes inadequate consultation with key stakeholders in some of the communities, despite the claim of the Forestry Commission to have fully applied FPIC principles in the REDD+ program. This appears to be affecting the geographical connectivity and capability of the HIA to build a network of communities to support sustainable governance practices. In the interviews with the HIA Management Board and sub-HIA executives, financial constraints stand out as a major challenge. A Board member stated, “We are unable to generate funds to support our activities except to depend on NGOs and cocoa companies operating in the landscape.”
The interviews with representatives of NGOs, the Cocoa Board, and the Forestry Commission involved in Ghana Cocoa REDD+ suggest that the functional challenges faced by the HIA resulted from the rapid establishment of governance structures. Issues such as dysfunctional leadership, elite capture, poor finances, and undemocratic tenets of the existing CREMAs were not addressed before establishing the HIA. A partner in the consortium recounted, “The pressure was so high from the Ghana National REDD+ Secretariat and the World Bank to complete the whole governance structure… and the truth is, yeah, we did it, but I would not call it best practice”.
Law enforcement and compliance in the landscape are perceived to be ineffective. Through interviews with farmers and personal observations, we find that very little is being done to relocate owners of “illegal farms” in the landscape. Illegal logging and mining activities are also rife in the Krokosua Forest Reserve and other areas within the cocoa landscape. According to the sub-HIA and CREMA executives, monitoring teams in the HIA lack basic working equipment such as personal protective equipment and transport for field activities. The CREMA executives also suggested that the situation appears to be further compounded by political interference and the complicity of some traditional leaders who are involved in illegal forest activities.
In analyzing the interviews with the Forestry Commission and the cocoa company Touton on the contribution of cocoa companies to forest governance, we found that the Juabuso-Bia HIA and the first set of activities under Ghana Cocoa REDD+ were funded by Touton under the Partnership for Productivity, Protection, and Resilience in Cocoa Landscapes project (3PRCL). The 3PRCL was a three-year project targeting the production of deforestation-free cocoa beans. This was probably the first formalized relationship between a cocoa company and the HIA/CREMAs. Subsequently, other companies operating in the landscape appear to have contributed to improving HIA governance. Participants in focus groups and interviewed farmers and NGOs perceive, however, that cocoa companies tend to exaggerate their contributions to the REDD+ program, misrepresent or conceal information about their cocoa bean sourcing, and engage in double reporting. NGOs suggest that the double reporting is likely a result of the cocoa companies’ involvement in both the Cocoa Forest Initiative and the Ghana Cocoa REDD+.
The Limits to Poverty Alleviation
A focus group discussion with COCOBOD confirmed that the main economic NCB from Ghana’s Cocoa REDD+ program is the increase in cocoa production on existing farms. This is expected to be achieved by promoting cocoa intensification and climate-smart cocoa practices. The adoption of these practices by farmers to increase farm productivity would reduce the incentives for farmers to clear forest land for cocoa cultivation. The participants from COCOBOD also assumed that increased cocoa production would lead to increased incomes and a possible reduction in poverty among farmers in the Juabuso-Bia landscape. Interviews with the consortium partners confirm they have established demonstration farms, provided peer-learning experiences to farmers, and supported cocoa agroforestry and farm rehabilitation activities, recognizing their responsibilities in leveraging the HIA to support the livelihood activities of cocoa farmers.
A focus group discussion with COCOBOD and interviews with academic researchers and farm laborers suggested that capacity building for farmers in integrated pest management, crop and soil/water management, and agrochemical usage has been taking place. Interviews with farmers also confirmed that they had received farm input supplies, economic and shade trees, and training in climate-smart cocoa through the HIA structures and farmers’ cooperatives. Farmers expressed the expectation that this would help increase yields on their existing farms. In a focus group discussion, COCOBOD expressed its commitment to supporting farmers with adequate farm inputs to increase cocoa yields but acknowledged that they are limited financially to provide sufficient levels of support and training.
Cocoa farmers and COCOBOD expressed in focus group discussions and interviews that the uptake of climate-smart cocoa has been seriously hampered by inadequate amounts of farm input supplies, conflicting communication on climate-smart cocoa, poor cocoa extension services, unfavorable financing schemes and the abandonment of uncompleted cocoa rehabilitation farms. In relation to the latter, a CREMA executive recounted, “A farmer cleared all his 8-acre cocoa farm in anticipation of having his farm rehabilitated but never received the needed support. We now call the farm ‘airplane park’.
In relation to the amount of farm input supplies, interviews and focus group discussions with farmers, farm laborers, and COCOBOD all confirmed that farmers are supplied with inadequate quantities of Cocoa Board-approved fertilizers and pesticides. The farmers interviewed also expressed serious concerns about receiving supplies irregularly from COCOBOD and the companies. They further expressed their dissatisfaction with the low productivity of their farms and its effects on their incomes: A female farmer explained, “Years ago, when we harvested cocoa from our farms and heaped the beans, and a person sitting by the heap raised their hand, a person on the other side of the heap could not see the raised hand. That is not the case anymore.”
Other concerns of farmers about the ability of Ghana REDD+ to alleviate poverty, expressed through interviews, include the low seasonal producer price, tenure insecurity, and the short-changing of cocoa farmers by cocoa purchasing clerks. Cocoa purchasing clerks, in turn, expressed dissatisfaction with the delay in the release of funds by cocoa companies for cocoa purchases. A clerk stated, “We are not able to pay farmers promptly when there is a delay in the release of funds for cocoa purchases.” Based on these concerns and challenges, a cocoa farmer claims that “Currently, cocoa farming is unattractive, and if you want to identify some of the poorest people in Ghana, then it is cocoa farmers.” In addressing these concerns, cocoa companies explained that they introduced some income diversification enterprises (mushroom farming, beekeeping, fish farming, grasscutter rearing, and soap making) to supplement farmers’ income.
Interviewed cocoa companies revealed that they prioritize support service delivery models and structures outside the HIA to provide a variety of services (such as farm inputs) to their registered farmers rather than to registered farmers involved in the Ghana Cocoa REDD+. Most interviewed consortium partners expressed frustration about the quality of collaboration among the consortium, leading to reduced cocoa production on existing farms.
Despite efforts through Ghana Cocoa REDD+ to reduce incentives that drive the expansion of cocoa farms into forest areas, interviews with farmers indicate that in the past five years, they have increased their farm sizes by an average of 3-4 acres. These increases in farm size were undertaken purposely to increase cocoa production and involved the clearing of both reserve and off-reserve forest areas. According to most farmers in both interviews and focus group discussions, unprecedented cocoa production levels recorded in the 2020/21 season were mostly due to new farms and the smuggling of cocoa into Ghana along the Ghana-Côte d’Ivoire border.
Limits to Inclusion and Participation
Based on the interviews and focus group discussions with actors, the inclusion and participation of community actors in HIA activities can be described as tokenism. Some farmers indicated that they are not fully represented at the consortium meetings where key decisions on HIA governance are made. In the focus group discussions, farmers expressed concerns that their interests are rarely considered in the Ghana Cocoa REDD+ program except when it serves the interest of the consortium partners. Several CREMA executives also expressed frustration at what they see as the inadequate flow of information from the HIA Management Board to the CREMAs.
Interviewed farmers and NGOs questioned the role of the Feedback and Grievances Reporting System (FGRS) in providing a platform for participation by addressing the concerns of stakeholders in the Ghana Cocoa REDD+ program. The FGRS is a REDD+ safeguard mechanism for addressing grievances and potential conflicts in Ghana Cocoa REDD+ and is administered by the Forestry Commission. Farmers and NGO representatives questioned the low visibility of the FGRS committee in the landscape and raised concerns about its composition as a neutral arbiter in addressing farmers’ grievances.
Our interviews with the HIA Management Board revealed that women make up 27% of the Board’s membership, while more women have been appointed to lower levels of the HIA governance system, where they have less influence on decision-making. According to the Board, they have not achieved the objective of 50% female representation. The separate focus group discussions among male and female farmers suggested that the continued low participation of women in HIA/CREMA activities is still a challenge due to gender norms.
Nonetheless, interviews with NGOs revealed that the HIA has contributed to building women’s capacity to conduct farm surveys relating to cocoa farming activities and collect biodiversity data. Also, interviews and focus group discussions confirmed that, due to the various sensitization activities in the cocoa landscape by the consortium partners, more women are nurturing the desire to put themselves up for leadership positions. A case in point is the bold statement made by a female CREMA executive during an interview that “I can become a CREMA chairperson”.
Tenure Rights Limitations
Farmers, farm laborers, and the members of the consortium partners confirm in interviews that the uptake of economic/shade tree planting on farms in the cocoa landscape is increasing. Farmers explain their rationale for planting economic and shade trees in interviews as “Trees call rains”; “Where we planted oframu, we ‘ve had more cocoa pods”; and “Shade trees attract birds into our farms to control insects.” Interviews and focus group discussions with CREMA executives revealed that some CREMAs have established community plantations with communal tenure rights, with funding for the initial labor costs provided by NGOs. Farmers involved in the modified taungya system have also replanted depleted forests, where benefits would be shared among farmers, the Forestry Commission, landowners, and local communities.
From the interviews with farmers and academic researchers who work in the cocoa landscape, we understand that the incorporation of shade and economic trees on farms is currently hampered by the erratic supply of seedlings from the Forestry Commission, NGOs, and cocoa companies. Another challenge is the piecemeal approach to tree rights registration, which has led to a scaling down of tree planting efforts. Due to the challenges with tree rights registration, “Some farmers in Yawmatwa are cutting down their planted trees to prevent timber companies from harvesting them”, according to an NGO representative in the Juabuso-Bia HIA.
Complementary Findings and Contradictions in the Outcomes of Our Methods
All three methods (Q-methodology, semi-structured interviews, and focus groups) generated outcomes to suggest that the forests in the Juabuso-Bia HIA landscape were diminishing in size and value but that the Ghana Cocoa REDD+ has the potential to reverse this trend – supporting the findings on the potential of enhanced sub-national governance through the HIA. Community participation and collective decision-making are particularly supported by the constitution of all the sub-HIAs, which focus on the importance of bringing together chiefs, farmers, and other stakeholders within the landscape to collaboratively address deforestation.
In relation to inclusion and participation, the sub-HIA constitution also establishes the quota system, allowing for the representation of women and minority groups across the HIA hierarchy. However, women are not yet sufficiently represented at the different management levels of the HIA, although more women are engaged at the CREMA level than at the level of the Sub-HIA Executive Committees and the HIA Management Board.
Although there was consensus among the methods that the CREMA provides a platform for engagement in natural resource management, the interviews and focus groups added a deeper understanding of some of the limitations associated with HIA governance. Issues of rapid implementation of the HIA structure and the carry-over of prior problems of elite capture, dysfunctional leadership, and inadequate democratic practices of the existing CREMAs are perceived to limit the effectiveness of the HIA to facilitate the implementation of Ghana Cocoa REDD+. Also, the move toward a top-down approach and a recentralization of decision-making has affected the engagement of CREMA communities.
Interviews provide a general picture that collaboration between the HIA and the consortium partners still needs improvement to facilitate effective landscape governance. Outcomes from the three methods also indicate that the Ghana Cocoa REDD+ program is likely to struggle to improve farmers’ livelihoods and address poverty because of limited efforts to strengthen land and tree security for cocoa farmers and not providing a sufficient and stable supply of farm inputs, effective extension services, and cocoa rehabilitation to farmers.
While the Q-sort largely suggests that the HIA and CREMA governance framework fosters community participation, the interviews and focus groups give ample details of the difficulties communities have in effectively participating in the HIA, the lack of dissemination and awareness of HIA activities among communities, and the failure to address issues of dysfunctional leadership, elite capture, and undemocratic tenets of existing CREMAs prior to the creation of the HIA. The interviews and focus group discussions indicate that community participation is further weakened with the expansion of the CREMAs to HIA status.